From: mrh@centerline.com (Mike Huben) Newsgroups: talk.politics.libertarian,alt.politics.libertarian,alt.activism,alt.anarchism,alt.individualism,misc.legal,talk.politics.misc Subject: Re: Contra Social Contract Theory Date: 10 May 1995 20:31:09 GMT Message-ID: <3or7qd$a3@wcap.centerline.com> References: <3o91mm$i8s@wcap.centerline.com> Summary: Tim Starr's lengthy "improvement" of Spooner's rant doesn't even address the defenses Locke wrote roughly 100 years before Spooner. In classic crank manner, they pick and choose arguments they like and ignore counterarguments in hope of swaying the ignorant. In article and article , Tim Starr wrote: > A Critique of Social Contract Theory > or > Spooner Brought Up to Date > The social contract theory of the State has it that the State is formed by > the agreement of the People to establish a monopoly on legitimate violence > to perform certain functions. Social contract theorists sometimes disagree > about the nature and scope of the State's functions, but most agree that they > include, at a minimum, providing police, courts, & the military. Many social > contract theorists argue that other things should be done by the State, but > few besides anarchists question whether the State should do these things at > all. For the sake of this discussion, then, let's stick to these three. If > the theory holds for them, then it may hold for others as well. If it doesn't > hold for these, then it may be difficult to see how it could justify > additional State functions. Wow, Tim, you can't even get your opening lines right. You're much like Spooner that way. I think that you need to read some Locke: he answered many of Spooner's and your objections centuries earlier. "Sec. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it...." Note that you've left out the whole notion of legislation, the idea of codifying the offenses upon which the police and courts will act. > On this minimal conception of the functions of the State, then, social > contract theory has it that the People are obligated to pay taxes to the State > and abide by its rules in exchange for the protection they get from the > police, courts, & military. In turn, the State is obligated to protect the > People. In theory, there is mutual agreement between the People & the State > to these terms and this substance, and there is mutual obligation. But does > this theory hold in practice? In practice, is there really mutual agreement > and mutual obligation about this relationship? I will argue that, in > practice, neither mutual agreement nor mutual obligation can be found in the > relationship between the People and the State. Further, I will argue that, > in practice, there is no such social contract. Fine. Your objections to these are easily addressed. > Some argue that the Constitution of a country is the social contract. But, > as Lysander Spooner pointed out, written Constitutions have "no inherent > authority or obligation." They have "no authority or obligation at all, > unless as a contract between man and man." At most, they can only be > contracts between those who were alive and "already come to years of > discretion, so as to be competent to make reasonable and obligatory contracts" > when they are written. Further, they can only obligate those "consulted on > the subject, or asked, or permitted either to express their consent or dissent > in any formal manner." And, those who may authorize & be obligated to > Constitutions have "no natural power or right to make it obligatory upon their > children." ("No Treason: the Constitution of No Authority," the Lysander > Spooner Reader, p. 71) The Constitution of a country (and the laws pursuant to it) are the social contract. However Spooner pursues a number of gross fallacies in making his arguments. (1) "Man and man" is a ridiculous requirement for a contract, as anyone who has heard of corporations should understand. (2) "They can only be contracts between those who were alive" also fails the smoke test of corporations. (3) Requirement of a formal manner of consent or dissent is absurd: we daily make informal contracts (such as ordering meals at restaurants.) (4) The social contract is not obligatory on children: they may emmigrate. > How else could the people agree to the State? "If they have done so, they can > only have done so in only one of both of two ways, viz., by voting, and paying > taxes." (ibid, p. 73) False dilemma: there are many other tokens we may accept as agreement to the social contract. Locke suggests acceptance of property that previous owners have bound to the state: "Sec. 116... It is true, that whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex such conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any common-wealth, as may oblige his son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were his father's; because that estate being his father's property, he may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases." We also may take territorial residency or employment as a token if we accept territorial ownership rights of the state, since the person is free to leave. This too is covered in Locke. "Sec. 119... No body doubts but an express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government." Both Spooner and Tim Starr are dishonest in their presentation of this false dilemma, especially considering that Locke was one of the major influences in the design of the Constitution. > Taxation might seem at first to indicate the consent of the governed since > people seem to willingly pay the State to protect them. However, the Mafia > has also claimed to "protect" people in exchange for payment. In fact, > the "protection" money collected by the Mafia isn't willingly paid at all, > but extorted by the Mafia from its victims. In fact, it isn't "protection" > money at all, but extortion. Extortion is defined as "obtaining property > from another by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, > or under color of official right." (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 302). The Ma- > fia's "protection" is neither freely offerend nor freely accepted. Those who > don't pay their "protection" money are threatened with harm to their lives, > liberties, & properties. > > The same thing goes for taxation. The State doesn't wait for anyone to > request its "services," and, like the Mafia, its offers are ones that you > can't refuse. Any immigrant can tell you you're a liar. What immigrant is taxed before he enters the US? What immigrant is forced to come to the US? Not to mention, what resident currently paying taxes is compelled to remain in the US and pay US taxes? Not to mention that you are presuming your own conclusion by accepting the "wrongful" part of the description. > Those who decline its offers are threatened with harm to their > life, liberty, or property, too. Where the Mafia may firebomb the home or > business of those who don't pay up, the State will rob, beat, imprison, and > even kill those who refuse to pay their taxes because they reject the > "services" the State has to offer. The nature of enforcement of contract is entirely unrelated to whether the contract itself is legitimate. Penalties and procedures for handling violation of contract vary widely. If your big beef is that you want a civil procedure for violation of the social contract, instead of the current procedure specified in the contract, then you have not criticized the legitimacy of the contract itself. > Taxation may seem analogous to rent paid by a tenant to its landlord, but > this analogy doesn't hold water, either. While legitimate landlords get > their property by being the first to make use of it and mark it off or by > getting it in trade or as a gift from someone who did, etc., the State doesn't > get its territory that way. The State gets its territory the same way as the > Mafia: by violence, or the threat thereof. Thus, neither the State nor the > Mafia are the legitimate owners of anything they get by means of their > extortion. Who was first to "make use of it and mark off" the majority of the world's property? Unless you can answer that question, you are unable to identify "legitimate landlords". In actual practice, there is hardly any PROPERTY (real estate, let alone territory) in the world that has not been taken by violence or the threat thereof. However, if you wish to accept that particular Lockean fable, then you should also accept his explanation of state acquisition of territory: "Sec. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any common-wealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of that common-wealth, as long as it hath a being. VVhoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to, and under the government of that common-wealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the common-wealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of it." > Furthermore, this assumes that the State claims title to all the real estate > within its territory, which isn't always the case. In fact, land title was > held "allodium" ("Land held absolutely in one's own right, and not of any > lord or superior; land not subject to feudal duties or burdens. An estate > held by absolute ownership, without recognizing any superior to whom any duty > is due on account thereof." - ibid, p. 39), or "fee simple absolute" ("A fee > simple is an estate limited absolutely to a man and his heirs and assigns > forever without limitation or condition. An absolute or fee-simple estate is > one in which the owner is entitled to the entire property, with unconditional > power of disposition during his life, and descending to his heirs and legal > representatives upon his death intestate." - ibid, p. 317) in England prior to > the Norman Conquest. But, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out in his "Summary > View of the Rights of British America": > > "America was conquered, and her settlements made and firmly established, at > the expense of indidividuals, and not of the British public. Their own blood > was spilt in acquiring lands for their settlement, their own fortunes expended > in making that settlement effectual. For themselves they fought, for > themselves conquered, and for themselves alone they have right to hold. No > shilling was ever issued from the public treasures of his Majesty, or his > ancestors, for their assistance, till of very late times, after the colonies > had become established on a firm and permanent footing. That then, indeed, > having become valuable to Great Britain for her commercial purposes, his > Parliament was pleased to lend them assistance against an enemy who would fain > have drawn to herself the benefits of their commerce, to the great > aggrandisement of herself, and danger of Great Britain. Such assistance, and > in such circumstances, they had often before given to Portugal and other > allied states, with whom they carry on a commercial intercourse. Yet these > sttes never supposed that by calling in her aid, they thereby submitted > themselves to her sovereignty. Had such terms been proposed, they would have > rejected them with disdain, and trusted for better, to the moderation of their > enemies, or to a vigorous exertion of their own force... > > "America was not conquered by William the norman, nor its lands surrendered to > him or any of his successors. Possessions there are, undoubtedly, of the > Allodial nature. Our ancestors, however, who migrated hither, were laborers, > not lawyers. The fictitious principle, that all lands belong originally to > the King, they were early persuaded to believe real, and accordingly took > grants of their own lands from the Crown." - Thomas Jefferson, "Summary view > of the rights of British America," LIFE & SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS > JEFFERSON, ed. Adrienne Koch & William Peden, Random House, (c) 1972, > pp. 294-95, 308 > > This error didn't waive the right, however. Here we have a citation out of context. If you read a little further, Jefferson declares that the local society has a right to allot lands in its own fashion: "From the nature and purpose of civil institutions, all the lands within the limits which any particular society has circumscribed around itself are assumed by that society, and subject to their allotment only. This may be done by themselves, assembled collectively, or by their legislature, to whom they may have delegated sovereign authority; and if they are alloted in neither of these ways, each individual of the society may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy will give him title." In this passage and the remainder of the document, Jefferson CLEARLY has adopted the Lockean paradigm. His mention of allodial lands is to establish that America is independent of feudal obligation by British practice, not to declare that there is no government authority whatsoever; in his conclusion, he takes for granted the colonies rights to tax and regulate themselves: "Still less let it be proposed that our properties within our own territories shall be taxed or regulated by any power on earth but our own." > There are other essential differences between the rent paid by tenant to > landlord and the tax paid by people to the State: tenants voluntarily choose > to enter into their landlord's estate, and to pay the rent charged by the > landlord for the tenant's occupation of the estate. Furthermore, tenants > can quit the premises and thus relieve themselves of liability to pay rent > to the landlord. Neither condition obtains in the relationship between the > People and the State. Even if we assume that the State holds legitimate > original title to its territory, this could only obligate people to pay rent > if they'd voluntarily occupied it in the first place. Furthermore, the > People aren't relieved of tax liability even if they leave the country if > the country in question is that claimed by the Federal Government of the USA, > which requires its citizens to pay taxes to it no matter whether they live > within its geographical boundaries or not. I've already cited Locke on consent. Locke also addresses vacating in detail: "Sec. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other common-wealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any common- wealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it." Our actual government, as any emmigrant could tell you, allows dissolution of citizenship. In short, citizens CAN vacate. > The very word "taxation" means "forced exaction," according to Charles Adams, > tax attorney and leading historian of taxation (see his books "Fight, Flight, > Fraud," and "For Good and Evil"). As he points out, the common-law principle > of fair benefit received for consideration given has no place in tax law. > Black's Law Dictionary says: "Essential characteristics of a tax are that it > is not a voluntary payment for donation, but an enforced contribution..." > (p. 758) Rents too are enforced contribution. So? Enforcement of contract is common both to states and private individuals. Both rents and taxes are contractually agreed to. > There are a number of reasons why voting isn't an expression of the consent > of the governed as well. Consent of the governed TO WHAT? To the social contract? Our social contract does NOT specify voting as consent. To the results of the vote? Agreement to the social contract binds us to the results of the vote. Thus these following arguments of yours are irrelevant, when they are not also outright stupid. > One is that voting is also done under duress, just > as is paying taxes. Taxes are assessed whether one votes or not, so many > vote out of self-defense in order to prevent their taxes from being used > against them in some way or another. There is no duress any more than a boxer who has signed for a match fights under duress. The boxer's defense is necessitated by his voluntary agreement to the match: it is not forced upon him. Your argument is simplistic, and ignores the actual complexity of the case. > Another is that the majority often > votes to violate the rights of the minority, which violates the principle > that contracts to violate the rights of another are invalid. If voting was the only feature of our social contract, then this criticism might be workable. However, our government has a judicial branch which invalidates such violations. Voting is just one characteristic of our government: dissecting it out to show that by itself it would have problems tells us nothing significant about our social contract, consent to it, or consent to the results of the vote. > Still another > reason is that since voting is done by secret ballot there can be no meeting > of the minds as is necessary for any legally binding agreement. Once again, you pretend ignorance of the actual complexity of our system. The vote is not the binding agreement: the social contract is. > Yet another > reason is that voting could at most only bind those who actually voted in > any given election, but elections are commonly held to obligate those many > people who don't vote. Still another absurd claim based on an arbitrary restriction of right to contract. Why should I be prohibited from agreeing to a contract that specifies that I may or may not vote, but must abide by the results of the vote until the contract is terminated? > Still further, those who vote for candidates who lose > the election can't be said to have consented to the rule of the winner. Once again, voting isn't the contract: the contract specifies voting as the decision making methodology. Talk about willful ignorance. > There may be other reasons, but I think these are enough to prove that voting > can't be an expression of the consent of the governed. It doesn't matter how many invalid reasons you produce: you still need a valid one. > One could still argue that even though there's no mutual agreement to pay > taxes & obey the State's rules in exchange for the State's protection, the > people are still obligated to do so because the State is obligated to protect > them whether they agree to it or not. Wrong. Locke says that the state is obligated to the people because they have consented, not the people to the state. "Sec. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people." By reversing the causality of the obligation, you have created a strawman that isn't social contract. > But, in fact, not only doesn't the > State have any obligation to protect those who haven't agreed to it, it > doesn't have any legal obligation to protect people who've not only agreed > to the State's protection but desperately need it because they have no other > way of getting protection. Neither the police, courts, military, or > any other officials or employees of the State have to protect them: > > "As numerous courts have held, they have no legal obligation to protect anyone > in particular. You cannot sue them for failing to prevent you from being > the victim of a crime." - Jeffrey Snyder It would be amusing to demand of any utopia 100% protection from being victimized. The extent of the obligation by the state cannot be expected to be perfection. Locke (above) limits the obligations to "providing against those three defects above mentioned", meaning creation of law, establishment of courts, and execution of law. > This is an instance of the legal doctrine of "sovereign immunity," which > stems from the medeival notion that the king could do no wrong. Black's Law > Dictionary says that it "precludes litigant from asserting an otherwise > meritorious cause of action against a sovereign or a party with sovereign > attributes unless sovereign consents to suit." (p. 724) The State has been > to kind as to waive sovereign immunity in some cases under the Federal Tort > Claims Act of 1946, but "preserves governmental immunity with respect to the > traditional categories of intentional torts, and with respect to acts or > omissions which fall within the 'discretionary function or duty' of any > federal agency." (p. 317) What is the scope of this "discretionary function > or duty"? It can be found in Black's Law under the heading of "sovereignty": > "The power to do everything in a state WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY, - to make laws, > to execute and to apply them, to impose and collect taxes and levy > contributions, to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance or of > commerce with foreign nations, and the like" (emphasis added). The several > states under the federal government also have their own statutes relieving > them and the city and county government under them of liability for any and > all failures to protect the people from threats to their lives, liberties, > and properties as do the county & city levels of government. Immunity (or limited liability) is common in contracts of all sorts. Check the contract the next time you develop some film: your claims are limited (by your voluntary agreement) to a replacement roll of film. Check the contract for some software that you buy: you'll usually find a disclaimer of liability for incorrect behavior of the software leading to damages. There is nothing wrong with such limits, as long as you accept them. Likewise, sovereign immunity is a part of our voluntary social contract. > One could still argue that even though the State has no legal obligation to > live up to its end of the deal it still has a political obligation: if its > officials breach the social contract, then they can get defeated in their next > election and replaced with someone else. However, this objection was antici- > pated by Lysander Spooner as well: > > "Suffrage is equally powerless and unreliable. It can be exercised only > periodically; and the tyranny must at least be borne until the time for suf- > frage comes. Besides, when the suffrage is exercised, it gives no guaranty > for the repeal of existing laws that are oppressive, and no security against > the enactment of new ones that are equally so. The second body of legislators > are liable and likely to be just as tyrannical as the first. If it be said > that the second body may be chosen for their integrity, the answer is, that > the first were chosen for that very reason, and yet proved tyrants. The > second will be exposed to the same temptations as the first, and will be just > as likely to prove tyrannical. Who ever heard that succeeding legislatures > were, on the whole, more honest than those that preceded them? What is there > in the nature of men or things to make them so? If it be said that the first > body were chosen from motives of injustice, that fact proves that there is a > portion of society who desire to establish injustice; and if they were > powerful or artful enough to procure the election of their instruments to > compose the first legislature, they will be likely to be powerful enough or > artful enough to procure the election of the same or similar instruments to > compose the second. The right of suffrage, therefore, and even a change of > legislators, guarantees no change of legislation - certainly no change for > the better. Even if a change for the better actually comes, it comes too > late, because it comes only after more or less injustice has been irreparably > done. > > "But, at best, the right of suffrage can be exercised only periodically; and > between the periods the legisltors are wholly irresponsible. No despot was > ever more entirely irresponsible than are republican legislators during the > period for which they are chosen. They can neither be removed from their > office, nor called to account while in office, nor punished after they leave > their office, be their tyranny what it may. Moreover, the judicial and > executive departments of the government are equally irresponsible TO THE > PEOPLE, and are only responsible (by impeachment, and dependence for their > salaries), to those irresponsible legislators. This dependence of the > judiciary and executive upon the legislature is a guaranty that they will > always sanction and execute its laws, whether just or unjust. Thus the > legislators hold the whole power of the government in their hands, and are > at the same time utterly irresponsible for the manner in which they use it." > - Lysander Spooner, "Trial By Jury," THE LYSANDER SPOONER READER, pp. 126-27 Anybody with the slightest knowledge of American history can see what poppycock this is. The point of suffrage is not 100 percent justice, but seeking an optimum. Suffrage has worked historically: innumerable offices have changed hands because of wrongs by the officeholder. And we all have seen jurors, executives, and legislators removed in the middle of their terms. > How could the State be obliged to protect those who reject its offer if it > isn't even obliged to protect those who not only accept the offer but whose > very lives depend upon it? The social contract does not pretend to be a nursemaid. Spooner nowhere defends his claims that the state has that specific obligation to specific individuals despite the fact that he yammers incessantly about how the state explicitly claims it doesn't. > What about enforcement of the State's obligation to protect the people by > means of the right of revolution? First of all, in order for the people to > be able to overthrow the State by armed revolution they have to be able to > break the State's monopoly of legitimate violence by not only being able to > keep & bear arms but also by having the authority to judge the legitimacy of > their actions. Thus, they have to rob the State of its defining character- > istics. The government that would then be overthrown may be tyrannical, but > it wouldn't be a State except in the sense of being an organization which > tries to monopolize legitimate violence by means of force & fraud, however > unsuccessfully it might do so. In fact, even if a State didn't claim > sovereign immunity, even if it were based upon the consent of the governed, > it still couldn't be held to its end of the deal without first being robbed > of its status as a State. Our social contract does not rely on that enforcement mechanism. If you think it does, please show it in the Constitution. > There being no practical way to enforce obligations upon > an existing State, There is a practical way, as the USA demonstrates, which Spooner and Tim pretend ignorance of: balance of powers. The three branches of government and citizen's suffrage have enforced the obligations of our social contract quite well for the past two centuries. > no such obligations can exist in practice, which means > that there can be no mutual obligation between the People & the State - which > means that there can be no contract between People & State, since mutual > obligation is a necessary condition for contract to exist. Too bad your premise was false, else you might have a valid argument. > Secondly, Spooner answered this one as well: "The right of revolution... is of > no practical value, except for those who are stronger than the government. So > long, therefore, as the oppressions of a government are kept within such > limits as simply not to exasperate against it a power greater than its own, > the right of revolution cannot be appealed to, and is therefore inapplicable > to the case. This affords a wide field for tyranny..." - ibid, pp. 129 But in actual practice, our balance of powers has resulted in a much narrower field for tyranny. This is hardly surprising, since it is only Spooner's deliberate oversimplifications and omissions that allow his ridiculous positions. > It turns out that the alleged "social contract" is doubly one-sided: the only > party to agree to it is the State, and the only party that is obliged by it is > the People. The State agrees to collect taxes & enforce its rules upon the > People, and the people are obliged to pay those taxes & abide by those rules. > There is no mutuality of agreement nor any mutuality of obligation between the > State and the people, and, therefore, can be no contract. There is no more > contract between the State and the People than there is between the Mafia > and the victims of its extortion rackets or rapists and their victims. Thus, > the People have no obligation to pay taxes or to obey the State, and the State > has no legitimacy in attempting to enforce any such obligations. It turns out that the alleged argument against the social contract is doubly flawed: by misrepresentation of the social contract and by failing to address arguments well known for almost 100 years before Spooner wrote. Thus Tim's critique has no legitimacy in attempting to dissuade us. > Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! Think Universally, Act Selfishly Perhaps you should pay a little attention to the Enlightenment and some of its authors, such as Locke. Mike Huben (Check out the Critiques Of Libertarianism web page. The URL is http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~mrh/liber/) Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. John Jay in FEDERALIST No. 2